In 1995, Canada began unilaterally enforcing fishing rules just outside its 200-nautical-mile…

In 1995, Canada began unilaterally enforcing fishing rules
just outside its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, using military
force several times to threaten Spanish fishing ships, once even seizing one.
The actions appeared to be setting the stage for a nasty confrontation between
allies (Canada and the European Union). Instead, an agreement was reached that
limited fishing methods and catches in the area, as Canada had wanted. How
might we explain this episode in theoretical terms?

Realists would note the effectiveness of Canada’s resort to
military leverage, which drove the cost
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In 1995, Canada began unilaterally enforcing fishing rules
just outside its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, using military
force several times to threaten Spanish fishing ships, once even seizing one.
The actions appeared to be setting the stage for a nasty confrontation between
allies (Canada and the European Union). Instead, an agreement was reached that
limited fishing methods and catches in the area, as Canada had wanted. How
might we explain this episode in theoretical terms?

Realists would note the effectiveness of Canada’s resort to
military leverage, which drove the cost of European resistance way up and made
it worthwhile for the EU to come to terms with Canadian demands. Since treaties
such as UNCLOS are viewed with some skepticism by realists, they would
attribute Canada’s success to its proximity—the greater ease with which its
navy could deploy to the disputed area—and a stronger will to prevail
(reflecting the fact that the issue affected Canada’s national interests much
more than those of the EU).

Liberals could note, however, that the EU is far more
powerful than Canada overall, so sheer power politics does not provide a very
good starting point for explaining the outcome. Rather, liberals might
emphasize the collective goods problem involved in overfishing, and note that
Canada’s willingness to unilaterally take on the enforcement costs effectively
resolved the dilemma. Only the negotiation of the terms of what was being
enforced (the specific rules for fishing) remained, and there the conflicts of
interest were small compared with the overall range of mutual benefits produced
by close economic cooperation between Canada and the EU. The idea that
unilateral enforcement could resolve collective goods dilemmas is supported by
the comments of the chairman of a UN conference working on an international
fishing treaty. He noted that the Canadian–EU agreement “will help our
discussions here because it establishes the principle that there can be
boarding and monitoring on the high seas.” Critical theorists would be less
concerned about the question of enforcing norms, and might instead ask why
“enforcement” became the important question when thinking about overfishing.
Focusing on enforcement, as liberals and realists do, redirects our attention
away from larger questions such as the role of global capitalism in species
depletion. Critical theorists are concerned that problem-solving responses like
the creation of treaties and questions of their enforcement keep us from
applying deeper analyses and considering more radical solutions. Most critical
theorists, for example, do not think that capitalism can be “managed” to
produce better environmental outcomes; rather, capitalism would need to be
transformed in order to get to the root causes of environmental degradation.

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