CAMPBELL v. ROBINSON COURT OF APPEALS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 398 S.C. 12, 726 S.E.2D 221, S.C. APP. LEXIS

CAMPBELL v. ROBINSON COURT OF APPEALS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 398 S.C. 12, 726 S.E.2D 221, S.C. APP. LEXIS 124 (2012) In 2005, Campbell and Robinson became engaged. However, in 2006 the wedding was postponed and then canceled. Robinson refused to return the engagement ring and Campbell filed a lawsuit claiming the ring was his property. Robinson countered that Campbell breached his promise to marry and that she was entitled to repayment of her prenuptial expenses and compensation for damages to her health due to the situation. During the trial, Robinson claimed that not only had Campbell
CAMPBELL v. ROBINSON COURT OF APPEALS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 398 S.C. 12, 726 S.E.2D 221, S.C. APP. LEXIS 124 (2012) In 2005, Campbell and Robinson became engaged. However, in 2006 the wedding was postponed and then canceled. Robinson refused to return the engagement ring and Campbell filed a lawsuit claiming the ring was his property. Robinson countered that Campbell breached his promise to marry and that she was entitled to repayment of her prenuptial expenses and compensation for damages to her health due to the situation. During the trial, Robinson claimed that not only had Campbell canceled the wedding, but on two occasions he had told her to keep the ring. Campbell denied all claims. Campbell contended that an engagement ring is a gift conditioned upon marriage. The trial court ruled that the ring belonged to the party who was not at fault for the termination of the engagement. In other words, if Campbell reneged on his promise, Robinson could be entitled to damages. Campbell appealed. JUDGE THOMAS_An engagement ring by its very nature is a symbol of the donors continuing devotion to the donee. Once an engagement is cancelled, the ring no longer holds that significance. Thus, if a party presents evidence a ring was given in contemplation of marriage, the ring is an engagement ring. As an engagement ring, the gift is impliedly conditioned upon the marriage taking place. Until the condition underlying the gift is fulfilled, the attempted gift is unenforceable and must be returned to the donor upon the donors request. The person challenging the assertions that the ring is an engagement ring and therefore impliedly conditioned upon marriage has the burden of presenting evidence to overcome those assertions. This burden may be satisfied by presenting evidence showing that the ring was not given in contemplation of marriageit was not an engagement ringor was not conditioned upon the marriage. If the parties do not dispute that the ring was originally an engagement ring conditioned upon the marriage, the burden may also be satisfied by presenting evidence establishing the ring subsequently became the challengers property (recognizing that a conditional gift of an engagement ring could become an absolute gift after the engagement was cancelled). Jurisdictions differ on whether ownership of an engagement ring may be based upon fault in the breakup. Courts that do consider fault generally reason that it is unfair for a person to retain the fruit of a broken promise. In contrast, courts with a no-fault approach often base their decision upon the abolishment of heart balm actions, adoption of no-fault divorce, desire to limit courtroom dramatics, and reduction of the difficulty in determining the issue of what constitutes fault in the decline of a relationship. We hold that the consideration of fault has no place in determining ownership of an engagement ring. Generally, gift law will dictate who has the legal right to the ring In other contexts, the culpability of ones conduct is determined by legal standards such as the reasonable person. [N]egligence is the failure to use due care, i.e., that degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence and reason would exercise under the same circumstances. In contrast, no legal standard exists by which a fact finder can adjudge culpability or fault in a prenuptial breakup. (What is fault or the unjustifiable calling off of an engagement? . . . [S]hould courts be asked to determine which of the following grounds for breaking an engagement is fault or justified? (1) The parties have nothing in common; (2) one party cannot stand prospective in-laws; (3) a minor child of one of the parties is hostile to and will not accept the other party; (4) an adult child of one of the parties will not accept the other party; (5) the parties pets do not get along; (6) a party was too hasty in proposing or accepting the proposal; (7) the engagement was a rebound situation which is now regretted; (8) one party has untidy habits that irritate the other; or (9) the parties have religious differences. The list could be endless.); (What fact justifies the breaking of an engagement? The absence of a sense of humor? Differing musical tastes? Differing political views? . . . They must be approached with intelligent care and should not happen without a decent assurance of success. When either party lacks that assurance, for whatever reason, the engagement should be broken. No justification is needed. Either party may act. Fault, impossible to fix, does not count.) South Carolinas use of fault in dividing property within the family courts jurisdiction does not mandate the use of the fault approach for determining ownership of engagement rings when the marriage fails to occur. Two of the main purposes of an engagement are to prepare the couple for marriage and test the permanency of their compatibility. In some circumstances, the fault approach may penalize a party who innocently recognizes the couples incompatibility. Although fault cannot determine ownership of the ring, we affirm the denial of Campbells motions for directed verdict and JNOV on his actions for declaratory judgment and claim and delivery. Here, Campbell gave Robinson the ring during his proposal. Thus, he presented evidence that the ring was given in contemplation of marriage and therefore was an engagement ring conditioned upon the marriage occurring. Although Robinson kept the ring in a safe deposit box after the engagement was cancelled, without further evidence the ring would remain a conditional gift and Campbell would be entitled to recover it as a matter of law. Robinson explicitly characterizes the ring as an engagement ring. However, she has presented evidence that the ring was converted into an absolute gift by testifying Campbell told her to keep the ring after the engagement was cancelled. Because Campbell disputes this contention, the evidence conflicts as to whether the ring was conditioned upon marriage (noting that a gift is complete when there is a donative intent to transfer title to the property, a delivery by the donor, and an acceptance by the donee) . . . (delivery need not be manual but, so far as the donor can make it so, must only be some act which indicates a relinquishment of possession and dominion on the part of the donor in behalf of the donee.) Accordingly, ownership of the ring was a jury issue, and a directed verdict on Campbells claims for declaratory judgment and claim and delivery were not warranted. We also affirm the trial courts denial of Campbells motions for directed verdict and JNOV on his restitution claim. Here, the record does not contain evidence Campbell presented the ring to Robinson at her request. Nor does the record contain evidence Campbell permitted Robinson to keep the ring at her request or that he reasonably relied upon her to pay for the ring. Thus, Campbell was not entitled to a directed verdict or JNOV on his restitution claim. Campbell claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial absolute because the verdict form and jury charge were erroneous. In light of our rulings above, we agree. An appellate court will not reverse the trial courts decision regarding jury instructions unless the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial courts ruling is based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence. Here, the trial court provided an erroneous jury charge and verdict form. The evidence presented a jury issue of whether the ring was a conditional or absolute gift. While the charge instructed the jury that the gift was conditional, it did not explain that the gift could become absolute. Moreover, the jury charge and verdict form hinged ownership of the ring upon fault in the breakup. The focus on fault in the jury charge and verdict form undoubtedly affected the verdict. Fault was the only question posed to the jury to determine ownership of the ring, and the jurys finding on the question was adverse to Campbell. Thus, his actions for declaratory judgment and claim and delivery were prejudiced by the jury charge and verdict form. He is entitled to a new trial on those claims. In contrast, no evidence shows the ring was conferred to Robinson nongratuitously. Therefore, Campbell was not prejudiced by the verdict form or jury charge on his restitution action, and he is not entitled to a new trial on that claim. Robinsons Appeal Robinson argues the trial court erred in declining to grant her JNOV to award her damages, a new trial nisi additur, and a new trial as to damages because the jurys verdict was inconsistent. We affirm. CRITICAL THINKING Do you agree that it is hard to define and distinguish fault in the case of a broken engagement as the judge explained? ETHICAL DECISION MAKING Do you think it is more ethical for the person who gave the engagement ring to receive it if the engagement is broken regardless of who is at fault for the broken engagement? What ethical guideline is shaping your answer?

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