For more than a decade Addiel Soto Felician worked in the kitchen at the Villa Cofres_otel, a…

For more than a decade Addiel Soto
Felician worked in the kitchen at the Villa Cofres_otel, a beachfront, family
run establishment in Rinc__Puerto Rico. By January of 2010, Soto had become
the hotels head chef. However, by March he had been fired. Just one month
prior to his termination, Sandra Caro, the hotels general manager, told Soto:
I understand that you are old to work at the cooking line and that your
co-workers are also saying that you are old to work at the cooking line. Soto
further testified that Sandra Caro said to him at that meeting: You are no longer
capable to

For more than a decade Addiel Soto
Felician worked in the kitchen at the Villa Cofres_otel, a beachfront, family
run establishment in Rinc__Puerto Rico. By January of 2010, Soto had become
the hotels head chef. However, by March he had been fired. Just one month
prior to his termination, Sandra Caro, the hotels general manager, told Soto:
I understand that you are old to work at the cooking line and that your
co-workers are also saying that you are old to work at the cooking line. Soto
further testified that Sandra Caro said to him at that meeting: You are no longer
capable to work at the line because you are old. I am going to bring in a new
chef. Maybe I can let you work only in banquets. You need some long vacations
because you are old and slow at the line. We at the Hotel Villa Cofres_re
moving up, not down. Additionally, H_or P_z, the hotels restaurant and
kitchen manager, also made age-related remarks continually during the summer of
2009. According to Soto, P_z said to Soto throughout this period: Fool you
are too old; [f]ool, you are too slow. Does Soto have a claim under the
ADEA? Would it have been different if the comments had not been directly
related to Soto, but rather were general comments about people over the age of
40? Does it matter if the managers themselves are over 40 years old? [Soto-Feliciano
v. Villa Cofresi Hotels, Inc., 779 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2015).]